FILED
SUPREME COURT
STATE OF WASHINGTON
8/23/2017 12:51 PM
BY SUSAN L. CARLSON
CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TH	IE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,)
Petitioner, vs.) Supreme Court No
WENDY GRANATH, Respondent.) MOTION FOR ACCELERATED) REVIEW))

1. <u>IDENTITY OF MOVING PARTY</u>

The State of Washington, Petitioner, seeks the relief designated in part 2.

2. STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT

The State of Washington requests accelerated review of the State's petition for review, and, if the petition is granted, accelerated review of the decision below pursuant to RAP 18.12.

3. FACTS RELEVANT TO MOTION

RCW 10.99.050 authorizes courts to issue special postconviction domestic violence no-contact orders ("DVNCOs"), the knowing violation of which is a separate criminal offense. Consonant with chapter 10.99 RCW's emphasis on protecting victims of domestic violence, Washington's trial courts handle thousands of domestic violence prosecutions each year, and routinely impose DVNCOs under RCW 10.99.050 for the maximum period they believe to be allowed by law.

District courts are authorized to suspend all or part of a defendant's sentence for up to five years in domestic violence cases. RCW 3.66.068(1)(a). Until the Court of Appeals' recent published opinion in this case, State v. Granath, No. 74677-4-I (July 31, 2017), RCW 10.99.050 was widely understood to allow misdemeanor sentencing courts to enter DVNCOs for the maximum term the court could suspend the sentence, regardless of whether the sentence was actually suspended for that long. Even the model DVNCO form on the Washington Courts website sets five years as the default length of the order unless a shorter term is specified.

See WPF NC 02.0100, available at

http://www.courts.wa.gov/forms/?fa=forms.contribute&formID=86.

In <u>State v. Granath</u>, No. 74677-4-I (July 31, 2017), the Court of Appeals interpreted the language of RCW 10.99.050 and held, for the first time, that once a defendant's suspended sentence ends, any DVNCO issued under RCW 10.99.050 expires and must

be recalled. <u>Granath</u>, slip op. at 14. The State of Washington's petition for review of that decision is being filed concurrently with this motion. The <u>Granath</u> decision calls into question innumerable existing DVNCOs, which have been imposed to protect victims of domestic violence.

4. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF AND ARGUMENT

RAP 18.12 states that this Court "on its own motion or on motion by a party may set any review proceeding for accelerated disposition." In order to minimize the period of uncertainty that the Court of Appeals' decision has created and its concomitant harm to victims, this Court should accelerate review of the State's petition for review, and, if the petition is granted, accelerate review of the decision below.

The Court of Appeals decision upends the previous widespread understanding of how long a sentencing court can protect domestic violence victims through post-conviction DVNCOs, throwing into upheaval an area of criminal prosecution in which the legislature has declared the protection of victims to be of

paramount importance. 1 Thousands of plea agreements and misdemeanor sentences have been crafted on the belief that a DVNCO could remain in place up to maximum term of a court's sentencing authority regardless of whether the sentence is actually suspended for that long. Prosecutors and victims have sometimes agreed to little or no post-sentencing jail time in exchange for the defendant's agreement to a long DVNCO. Judges have crafted sentences believing that the ability to enforce a DVNCO through criminal prosecution for years to come provided a sufficient safety net to justify accepting a defendant's assurances that further incarceration was unnecessary as a deterrent. Other judges have terminated suspended sentences early, as soon as any affirmative conditions (e.g. fines, treatment, or community service) were completed, on the belief that doing so would reward the defendant's recent good behavior without lessening the victim's protection under the DVNCO.

Now, under <u>Granath</u>, any defendant who was sentenced more than 364 days ago and who does not have a suspended

¹ The purpose of chapter 10.99 RCW "is to recognize the importance of domestic violence as a serious crime against society and to assure the victim of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse which the law and those who enforce the law can provide." RCW 10.99.010

sentence still in effect is entitled to have the DVNCO recalled immediately. Some may even use <u>Granath</u> to argue that recall is necessary in unsuspended sentences as soon as the term of confinement ends, even if that is well short of 364 days after sentencing. There is also confusion about whether courts are obligated or entitled to recall DVNCOs invalidated by <u>Granath</u> sua sponte. With every recall of a DVNCO earlier than the sentencing court originally intended, there are profound consequences for victims.

Should this Court eventually reverse the Court of Appeals' decision, these recalls pursuant to <u>Granath</u> would become unwarranted and the State would be entitled to have the DVNCOs reinstated. The logistical challenges of keeping track of any recalls that occur pursuant to <u>Granath</u> while review is pending before this Court—not to mention the challenges involved in getting the DVNCOs reinstated should this Court reverse the Court of Appeals—are formidable and will come at great cost to the State and the courts, as well as victims.

Until this Court either denies the State's petition for review or renders a final decision on the merits, uncertainty—with all the

accompanying monetary and nonmonetary costs to victims, defendants, the State, and the courts—will abound. Accelerated review is therefore appropriate.

5. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should exercise its discretion under RAP 19.12 to accelerate consideration of the State's petition for review, and if it is granted, to accelerate review of the Court of Appeals' decision.

Submitted this _______ day of August, 2017.

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Certificate of Service by Electronic Mail

Today I directed electronic mail addressed to Christine Jackson, the attorney for the respondent, at Christine.Jackson@kingcounty.gov, containing a copy of the MOTION FOR ACCELERATED REVIEW, in State v. Wendy Granath, Court of Appeals Cause No. 74677-4, in the Court of Appeals, Division I, for the State of Washington.

I certify under penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated this 23day of August, 2017.

Name:

Done in Seattle, Washington

KING COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE - APPELLATE UNIT

August 23, 2017 - 12:51 PM

Filing Petition for Review

Transmittal Information

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